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  • Foucault Discourse and Truth- The Problematization of Parrhesia (Berkeley, Foucault

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    Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia.
    (six lectures given by Michel Foucault at Berkeley, Oct-Nov. 1983)
    THE MEANING OF THE WORD "PARRHESIA"
    1. Parrhesia and Frankness
    2. Parrhesia and Truth
    3. Parrhesia and Danger
    4. Parrhesia and Criticism
    5. Parrhesia and Duty
    1. Parrhesia and Rhetoric
    2. Parrhesia and Politics
    3. Parrhesia and Philosophy
    PARRHESIA IN THE TRAGEDIES OF EURIPIDES
    1. PhoenicianWomen
    2. Hippolytus
    3. The Bacchae
    4. Electra
    5. Ion
    6. Orestes
    7. Problematization of parrhesia
    PARRHESIA AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
    PRACTICES OF PARRHESIA
    1. Socratic Parrhesia
    2. Parrhesia and Community Life
    3. Parrhesia and Public Life
    4. Parrhesia and Personal Relationships
    TECHNIQUES OF THE PARRHESIASTIC GAMES
    1. Seneca & evening examination
    2. Serenus & general self-scrutiny
    3. Epictetus & control of representations
    4. Conclusion
    CONCLUDING REMARKS
    Foucault.info
    1 / 66
    THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORD ÐPARRHESIAÑ
    The Meaning of the Word " Parrhesia "
    The word "
    parrhesia
    " [παρρησία] appears for the first time in Greek literature in
    Euripides [c.484-407 BC], and occurs throughout the ancient Greek world of letters from the
    end of the Fifth Century BC. But it can also still be found in the patristic texts written at the
    end of the Fourth and during the Fifth Century AD -dozens of times, for instance, in Jean
    Chrisostome [AD 345-407] .
    There are three forms of the word : the nominal form "
    parrhesia
    " ; the verb form
    "
    parrhesiazomai
    " [παρρησιάζοȺαι]; and there is also the word "
    parrhesiastes
    "[παρρησιαστής]
    --which is not very frequent and cannot be found in the Classical texts. Rather, you find it
    only in the Greco-Roman period -in Plutarch and Lucian, for example. In a dialogue of
    Lucian, " The Dead Come to Life, or The Fisherman ", one of the characters also has the
    name " Parrhesiades "."[Παρρησιαδής]
    "
    Parrhesia
    " is ordinarily translated into English by "free speech" (in French by "franc-
    parler", and in German by "Freimthigkeit"). "
    Parrhesiazomai
    " or Ð
    parrhesiazesthai
    Ñ is to
    use
    parrhesia
    , and the
    parrhesiastes
    is the one who uses
    parrhesia
    , i.e., is the one who speaks
    the truth.
    In the first part of today's seminar, I would like to give a general aperu about the
    meaning of the word "
    parrhesia
    ", and the evolution of this meaning through Greek and
    Roman culture.
    1. Parrhesia and Frankness
    To begin with, what is the general meaning of the word "
    parrhesia
    "? Etymologically,
    "
    parrhesiazesthai
    " means " to say everything --from "
    pan
    " [πάυ] (everything) and "
    rhema
    "
    [δήȺα] (that which is said). The one who uses
    parrhesia
    , the
    parrhesiastes
    , is someone who
    says everything he has in mind : he does not hide anything, but opens his heart and mind
    completely to other people through his discourse. In
    parrhesia
    ,
    the
    speaker is supposed to
    give a complete and exact account of what he has in mind so that the audience is able to
    comprehend exactly what the speaker thinks. The word "
    parrhesia
    " then, refers to a type of
    relationship between the speaker and what he says. For in
    parrhesia
    , the speaker makes it
    manifestly clear and obvious that what he says is his own opinion. And he does this by
    avoiding any kind of rhetorical form which would veil what he thinks. Instead, the
    parrhesiastes
    uses the most direct words and forms of expression he can find. Whereas
    rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help him prevail upon the minds of his
    audience (regardless of the rhetorician's own opinion concerning what he says), in
    parrhesia
    ,
    the
    parrhesiastes
    acts on other people's mind by showing them as directly as possible what he
    actually believes.
    If we distinguish between the speaking subject (the subject of the enunciation) and the
    grammatical subject of the enounced, we could say that there is also the subject of the
    enunciandum -which refers to the held belief or opinion of the speaker. In
    parrhesia
    the
    speaker emphasizes the fact that he is both the subject of the enunciation and the subject of
    the enunciandum -that he himself is the subject of the opinion to which he refers. The specific
    " speech activity " of the parrhesiastic enunciation thus takes the form : " I am the one who
    thinks this and that "
    I use the phrase " speech activity " rather than John Searle's " speech act "(or Austin's "
    performative utterance ") in order to distinguish the parrhesiastic utterance and its
    commitments from the usual sorts of commitment which obtain between someone and what
    he or she says. For, as we shall see, the commitment involved in
    parrhesia
    is linked to a
    Foucault.info
    2 / 66
    certain social situation, to a difference of status between the speaker and his audience, to the
    fact that the
    parrhesiastes
    says something which is dangerous to himself and thus involves a
    risk, and so on.
    2. Parrhesia and Truth
    There are two types of
    parrhesia
    which we must distinguish. First ,there is a pejorative
    sense of the word not very far from " chattering " and which consists in saying any or
    everything one has in mind without qualification. This pejorative sense occurs in Plato, for
    example, as a characterization of the bad democratic constitution where everyone has the right
    to address himself to his fellow citizens and to tell them anything -even the most stupid or
    dangerous things for the city. This pejorative meaning is also found more frequently in
    Christian literature where such " bad "
    parrhesia
    is opposed to silence as a discipline or as the
    requisite condition for the contemplation of God. As a verbal activity which reflects every
    movement of the heart and mind,
    parrhesia
    in this negative sense is obviously an obstacle to
    the contemplation of God.
    Most of the time, however,
    parrhesia
    does not have this pejorative meaning in the
    classical texts, but rather a positive one. "
    parrhesiazesthai
    " means " to tell the truth. " But
    does the
    parrhesiastes
    say what he thinks is true, or does he say what is really true ? To my
    mind, the
    parrhesiastes
    says what is true because he knows that it is true ; and he knows that
    it is true because it is really true. The
    parrhesiastes
    is not only sincere and says what is his
    opinion, but his opinion is also the truth. He says what he knows to be true. The second
    characteristic of
    parrhesia
    , then, is that there is always an exact coincidence between belief
    and truth.
    It would be interesting to compare Greek
    parrhesia
    with the modern (Cartesian)
    conception of evidence. For since Descartes, the coincidence between belief and truth is
    obtained in a certain (mental) evidential experience. For the Greeks, however, the coincidence
    between belief and truth does not take place in a (mental) experience , but in a verbal activity,
    namely,
    parrhesia
    . It appears that
    parrhesia
    , in his Greek sense, can no longer occur in our
    modern epistemological framework.
    I should note that I never found any texts in ancient Greek culture where the
    parrhesiastes
    seems to have any doubts about his own possession of the truth. And indeed,
    that is the difference between the Cartesian problem and the Parrhesiastic attitude. For before
    Descartes obtains indubitable clear and distinct evidence, he is not certain that what he
    believes is , in fact, true. In the Greek conception of
    parrhesia
    , however, there does not seem
    to be a problem about the acquisition of the truth since such truth-having is guaranteed by the
    possession of certain moral qualities :when someone has certain moral qualities, then that is
    the proof that he has access to truth--and vice-versa. The " parrhesiastic game " presupposes
    that the
    parrhesiastes
    is someone who has the moral qualities which are required, first, to
    know the truth, and secondly, to convey such truth to others .
    If there is a kind of " proof " of the sincerity of the
    parrhesiastes
    , it is his courage.
    The fact that a speaker says something dangerous -different from what the majority believes-
    is a strong indication that he is a
    parrhesiastes
    . If we raise the question of how we can know
    whether someone is a truth-teller, we raise two questions. First, how is it that we can know
    whether some particular individual is a truth-teller ; and secondly, how is it that the alleged
    parrhesiastes
    can be certain that what he believes is, in fact, truth. The first question -
    recognizing someone as a
    parrhesiastes
    - was a very important one in Greco-Roman society,
    and, as we shall see, was explicitly raised and discussed by Plutarch, Galen, and others. The
    second skeptical question, however, is a particularly modern one which, I believe, is foreign
    to the Greeks.
    Foucault.info
    3 / 66
    3. Parrhesia and Danger
    Someone is said to use
    parrhesia
    and merits consideration as a
    parrhesiastes
    only if there
    is a risk or danger for him or her in telling the truth. For instance, from the ancient Greek
    perspective, a grammar teacher may tell the truth to the children that he teaches, and indeed
    may have no doubt that what he teaches is true. But in spite of this coincidence between belief
    and truth , he is not a
    parrhesiastes
    . However, when a philosopher addresses himself to a
    sovereign, to a tyrant, and tells him that his tyranny is disturbing and unpleasant because
    tyranny is incompatible with justice, then the philosopher speaks the truth, believes he is
    speaking the truth, and, more than that, also takes a risk (since the tyrant may become angry,
    may punish him, may exile him, may kill him). And that was exactly Plato's situation with
    Dionysius in Syracuse -concerning which there are very interesting references in Plato's
    Seventh Letter , and also in
    The Life of Dion
    by Plutarch. I hope we shall study these texts
    later.
    So you see, the
    parrhesiastes
    is someone who takes a risk. Of course, this risk is not
    always a risk of life . When, for example, you see a friend doing something wrong and you
    risk incurring his anger by telling him he is wrong, you are acting as a
    parrhesiastes
    . In such a
    case, you do not risk your life, but you may hurt him by your remarks, and your friendship
    may consequently suffer for it. If, in a political debate, an orator risks losing his popularity
    because his opinions are contrary to the majority's opinion, or his opinions may usher in a
    political scandal, he uses
    parrhesia
    .
    Parrhesia
    , then, is linked to courage in the face of danger
    : it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger. And in its extreme form,
    telling the truth takes place in the " game " of life or death.
    It is because the
    parrhesiastes
    must take a risk in speaking the truth that the king or tyrant
    generally cannot use
    parrhesia
    ; for he risks nothing.
    When you accept the parrhesiastic game in which your own life is exposed, you are taking
    up a specific relationship to yourself : you risk death to tell the truth instead of reposing in the
    security of a life where the truth goes unspoken. Of course, the threat of death comes from the
    Other, and thereby requires a relationship to himself : he prefers himself as a truth-teller rather
    than as a living being who is false to himself.
    4. Parrhesia and Criticism
    If, during a trial , you say something which can be used against you, you may not be using
    parrhesia
    in spite of the fact that you are sincere, that you believe what you say is true, and
    you are endangering yourself in so speaking. For in
    parrhesia
    the danger always comes from
    the fact that the said truth is capable of hurting or angering the interlocutor.
    Parrhesia
    is thus
    always a "game" between the one who speaks the truth and the interlocutor. The
    parrhesia
    involved, for example, may be the advice that the interlocutor should behave in a certain way,
    or that he is wrong in what he thinks, or in the way he acts, and so on. Or the
    parrhesia
    may
    be a confession to someone who exercises power over him, and is able to censure or punish
    him for what he has done. So you see, the function of
    parrhesia
    is not to demonstrate the truth
    to someone else, but has the function of criticism : criticism of the interlocutor or of the
    speaker himself. " This is what you do and this is what you think ; but this is what you should
    not do and should not think . " "This is the way you behave, but that is the way you ought to
    behave. " " This is what I have done, and was wrong in so doing. "
    Parrhesia
    is a form of
    criticism, either towards another or towards oneself, but always in a situation where the
    speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor. The
    Foucault.info
    4 / 66
    parrhesiastes
    is always less powerful than the one with whom he or she speaks . The
    parrhesia
    comes from " below ", as it were, and is directed towards " above". This is why an
    ancient Greek would not say that a teacher or father who criticizes a child uses
    parrhesia
    . But
    when a philosopher criticizes a tyrant, when a citizen criticizes the majority, when a pupil
    criticizes his or her teacher, then such speakers may be using
    parrhesia
    .
    This is not to imply, however, that anyone can use
    parrhesia
    . For although there is a text
    in Euripides where a servant uses
    parrhesia
    , most of the time the use of
    parrhesia
    requires
    that the
    parrhesiastes
    know his own genealogy, his own status ; i.e., usually one must first be
    a male citizen to speak the truth as a
    parrhesiastes
    . Indeed, someone who is deprived of
    parrhesia
    is in the same situation as a slave to the extent that he or she cannot take part in the
    political life of the city, nor play the " parrhesiastic game ". In "democratic
    parrhesia
    " --
    where one speaks to the assembly, the
    ekklesia
    -- one must be a citizen ; in fact, one must be
    one of the best among the citizens, possessing those specific personal, moral, and social
    qualities which grant one the privilege to speak.
    However, the
    parrhesiastes
    risks his privilege to speak freely when he discloses a truth
    which threatens the majority . For it was a well-known juridical situation when Athenian
    leaders were exiled only because they proposed something which was opposed by the
    majority, or even because the assembly thought that the strong influence of certain leaders
    limited its own freedom. And so the assembly was, in this manner, " protected " against the
    truth. That, then, is the institutional background of " democratic
    parrhesia
    "--which must be
    distinguished from that " monarchic
    parrhesia
    " where an advisor gives the sovereign honest
    and helpful advice.
    5. Parrhesia and Duty
    The last characteristic of
    parrhesia
    is this : in
    parrhesia
    , telling the truth is regarded as a
    duty. The orator who speaks the truth to those who cannot accept his truth, for instance, and
    who may be exiled, or punished in some way, is free to keep silent. No one forces him to
    speak ; but he feels that it is his duty to do so. When, on the other hand, someone is compelled
    to tell the truth (as, for example, under duress of torture), then his discourse is not a
    parrhesiastic utterance . A criminal who is forced by his judges to confess his crime does not
    use
    parrhesia
    . But if he voluntarily confesses his crime to someone else out of a sense of
    moral obligation, then he performs a parrhesiastic act to criticize a friend who does not
    recognize his wrongdoing, or insofar as it is a duty towards the city to help the king to better
    himself as a sovereign.
    Parrhesia
    is thus related to freedom and to duty.
    To summarize the foregoing,
    parrhesia
    is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has
    a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through
    danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or
    criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty.
    More precisely,
    parrhesia
    is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal
    relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve
    or help other people (as well as himself). In
    parrhesia
    , the speaker uses his freedom and
    chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death
    instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest
    and moral apathy.
    That, then, quite generally ; is the positive meaning of the word "
    parrhesia
    " in most of
    the Greek texts where it occurs from the Fifth Century BC to the Fifth Century AD.
    Foucault.info
    5 / 66
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